Abstract. We study the dual issues of allocation and coalition formation in a model of social learning. For a class of economies which can be expressed in terms of a real valued characteristic function, we first show that all self-perpetuating (steady-state) allocations realized from a simple bargaining game must be core allocations although players make simultaneous demands for surplus and only on their own behalf. We also exhibit a a sufficient condition for global (probabilistic) convergence to the core.
Introduction
Formal analysis of the economic effects of possible side deals between groups of agents in an economy dates back at least to Edgeworth (1881) . More recently, the construct that has become the cornerstone for such coalitional analyses is the notion of a characteristic function. First introduced by Von Neumann and Morgenstern, a characteristic function is a formalism that stylizes the potential gains from cooperation among various subgroups. It is simply a function that assigns a set of feasible allocations to each subgroup of agents.
Modelling economic situations in terms of characteristic functions has proved fruitful. For example, this has been the key for deriving insights into the relation between Walrasian allocations and the core. Characteristic functions also appear, in one guise or another, in a host of other economic applications that range from the design of cost-allocation schemes in natural monopolies to the study of the organization of a firm 1 .
It is a pleasure to thank Ken Binmore, Tilman Borgers, Kalyan Chatterjee, Phil Reny and Myrna Wooders for helpful conversations. Thanks are also due for Hyun Shin and two anonymous referees whose comments have considerably improved the exposition of this work. An earlier version of this paper was titled ''An Evolutionary Bargaining Model. ' Given a characteristic function, two questions arise: Which coalitions form and what is the resulting allocation of gains to individuals? The axiomatic methods and the non-cooperative game theoretic methods are the two distinct tools that are used in seeking answers to these questions. 2 The former is typically accused of lacking a proper microfoundation. The latter is immune to this reproach but is in turn attacked for the unlikely sophistication that it attributes to players seeking to coordinate on equilibrium play.
The purpose of this paper is to explore the dual issues of coalition formation and allocation for a particular class of characteristic functions 3 . The novelty is that we address these issues in the context of a dynamic model of social learning. The dynamics in our analysis and the fact that our model involves simple-minded and yet optimizing individuals counters some of the criticisms directed towards the standard approaches. In this respect our analysis draws from the growing literature on learning in non-cooperative games, particularly from Young (1993a) 4 .
In the model we study, there is a finite population divided into different types. A real valued characteristic function defined on the sets of types describes the surplus available at each date. At any given date, a randomly chosen representative for each type bargains myopically with his counterparts over the division of surplus for that period. Each of the types may be thought of as representing a different kind of skill or a level of wealth. The sequence of realized plays of the bargaining game can be interpreted as the history of how individuals from different classes learn to exploit their complementary endowments.
To concentrate on the dynamics, the bargaining game is kept simple. A player chosen to bargain can only demand a surplus on his own behalf. Demands are made simultaneously, as in Nash (1953) , Selten (1981) or Young (1993b) , and players remain committed to their demands. In contrast to these models, the current multiplayer setting permits the demands to be feasible in several different coalitions. A player's demand is met depending on whether he is in a coalition that forms. It follows that a player's optimal choice at any given date is governed by two things. First, his expectation of his opponents' choices and second, institutional details regarding coalition formation. We model these issues as follows.
As in Young (1993a) a player's expectation of his opponents' strategy is based on a sample of information about what others have done in the past. Unlike in Young (1993a), we impose only one restriction on a player's inference: if all observations in his sample consist of the same demands by his opponents, then he expects these demands to be repeated in the following period.
The institutional details regarding coalition formation are not made explicit but modelled by means of certain functional forms that determine the probability with which demands are met, once they are announced. The assumptions we make on these functional forms allow for a variety of coalition formation procedures.
It turns out that the evolution of the players' demands over time can be tracked by a certain Markov Chain, denoted by < -; P >. In an absorbing state of this process, players' demands settle down on a particular division of the surplus. In the first of our two main results, Theorem 1, we characterize the set of absorbing states directly in terms of the characteristic function. Despite the simplicity of our bargaining procedure it turns out that there is an isomorphism between the set of core allocations and the absorbing states. This provides a partial answer to the questions on coalition formation that we set out to address. If we insist on a selfperpetuating division of surplus, then it must be a core allocation and hence the grand coalition forms.
Theorem 1 offers no insight into how one may arrive at an allocation in the core from an arbitrary starting point. However, we are able to prove that the underlying bargaining game is weakly acyclic, in a sense close to that of Young (1993a) . This observation leads us to the other main result of this paper, Theorem 2. In this theorem, we present a sufficient condition under which the only persistent states of < -; P > are its absorbing states. This in particular implies that, regardless of the initial history, individuals (almost surely) learn to divide the surplus according to a core allocation in the long run. The sufficient condition can be interpreted as posing an upper bound on the amount of information possessed by an individual player relative to what is available in the society.
It should be noted that our study is not a formalization of Edgeworth's recontracting procedure. Edgeworth (1925, pages 313-4) had in mind a process of contracting and recontracting which involved proposals, challenges and counterproposals where ... agreements are renewed or varied many times. A ''final settlement'' is not reached until the market has hit upon a set of agreements which cannot be varied with advantage to all the recontracting parties : : :
Such a tâtonnement differs from the procedure studied here in being concerned only with intended allocations rather than allocations that are actually realized at each date, if feasible. It is particularly important to note that in our model a player is not able to change his demand if he finds out that it is not feasible.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Details of the basic model are spelt out in Section 2. Section 3 studies the absorbing states of the process < -; P >. Theorem 1 also appears in this section. Section 4 develops the dynamic properties of the model and contains Theorem 2. Section 5 concludes the paper with a short discussion on various aspects of the model.
The Model
In the model of social learning we consider in the sequel, the cooperative possibilities are described by a real valued function f, defined on all subsets of a finite set of players, N = f1; 2; : : : ; ng such that f(Á) = 0. A coalition is a non-empty subset of N. The notation S; T is used to denote typical coalitions. The characteristic function f has been interpreted in a number of ways in the literature. Perhaps the simplest interpretation is that f(S) is the maximum quantity of a single good that players in S can jointly produce, independent of the activities of the remaining players. For concreteness, we will maintain this interpretation 5 . Consider the following restrictions on f.
C1:
The function f is convex. That is, for any two coalitions S and T,
(1)
The substantive assumption is C1. On the one hand, if all the players supply a homogenous input, say labor, then C1 implies that the underlying production process displays nondecreasing returns to scale in labor. On the other hand, player i might be endowed with an inelastic supply of k i types of specific human capital, say e i = (e 
Observe that e S^eT = e S\T and e S _ e T = e S [T . It is now easy to see that assuming Á is supermodular is sufficient to render f convex. Indeed,
In this sense, C1 is a less severe restriction than it might initially appear. We refer the reader to Aumann and Maschler (1985) for other (economic) examples of convex characteristic functions.
Given C1, C2 ensures that every player has an incentive to cooperate with at least one coalition. If C2 does not hold for a player, say i, then this player is a dummy and we might as well study the allocation problem faced by N n fig. Assumptions C1 and C2 are maintained in the sequel.
Let v i (x) denote the VNM utility that player i derives from consuming x units of surplus. We assume that for all i 2 N, v i is a strictly increasing function.
Let t = 1; 2; : : : denote successive time periods. The economy is populated by a very large but finite number of individuals who are partitioned into n non-empty classes C 1 ; C 2 ; : : : ; C n . An individual from class i is a candidate for the role of player i in f. The surplus at any given date is generated according to a characteristic function f defined on subsets of N = f1; 2; : : : ; ng. At each date one individual from each class is drawn at random. For convenience, we shall speak of the candidate drawn from C i as player i although his identity may change from one period to the next. The n players are matched to play a bargaining game to decide on the division of surplus for that date.
As articulated in the introduction, the bargaining game is simple. A player can only demand a size of the surplus for himself. Demands are made simultaneously and players remain committed to their demands. The demands that players announce are recorded, for the sake of posterity. Following this, a player either receives his demand or has to remain content with his individually rational surplus f(fig). We elaborate on this below. ± denotes a typical vector of players' demands. X is said to be feasible for S, if X(S) · f(S) and strictly feasible for S if X(S) < f(S), where X(S) = P i2S x i . With some abuse of common terminology, we will occasionally refer to a X as an allocation regardless of its feasibility.
Let X(t) denote the demands from date t. A history up to date t is denoted by h(t) = X(1); X(2); : : : ; X(t). Note that histories are anonymous. That is, the identity of the individual from C i who has played a particular strategy at a given date is deemed irrelevant. Therefore, in this model there are no reputation effects. In fact, one may even think of the individual who has played the game once as being replaced with a clone whose must infer from social data how the game might be played. This underscores the fact that learning occurs at the social level and not necessarily at the individual level. Now, suppose X is realized at a certain date. Depending on X, coalitions form by the end of the period. We assume that a coalition cannot form unless it can meet the demands of all its members using its own resources. A player's demand is satisfied only if the player belongs to a coalition that eventually forms. Hence, it follows that a player's demand cannot be met if it is so high that X is not feasible for any coalition that contains him.
It is somewhat harder to speculate when a player's demand is satisfied. The mere fact that the demands of its members are feasible for a coalition does not necessarily mean that it can form for certain. This is because the demands may be feasible for more than one coalition but not for the union of some or all these coalitions. In such cases, some players will necessarily be disappointed while other players' demands are met in a coalition that forms. These considerations suggest that a careful description of the institutions and procedures according to which coalitions form and demands are appropriated is essential for proceeding with the analysis.
Here we pursue a method that allows a considerably parsimonious description of the institutional details. We introduce functions p i :
1], i = 1; : : : ; n where p i (xjX -i ) is the probability that player i's demand x is met if his opponents' demands are X -i . The p functions embody the unmodelled institutional details. Fortunately, it is not necessary to make strong assumptions on the procedures that determine who gets what after X is realized. As we shall see below, the restrictions we impose on these p functions are not particularly demanding.
Definition 1 Given X, a coalition S is said to exhibit property P(X), if 1. X is feasible for S.
If X is feasible for any other coalition T , then X is also feasible for S [ T .
Assumption 1 Given X, p i (x i jX -i ) = 0 if X is not feasible for any coalition that contains player i, for all i 2 N.
Assumption 2 Given X, if there exists a coalition S that exhibits property
We have already articulated Assumption 1. A possible justification for Assumption 2 is as follows. A player does not value the coalition in which his demand is met. Nevertheless, coalition formation requires processing information, which in this case are the demands that are announced. Suppose that the demands are processed at a central location in a randomly selected sequence and no coalition is deemed final until all the demands are considered. Then, it is not unreasonable to assume that a maximal (in terms of set inclusion) coalition whose demands are feasible forms eventually. Of course, which one of the possibly several maximal coalitions forms may well depend on the sequence in which the demands are processed. But clearly, if a coalition S exhibits property P(X), then every maximal coalition contains S and therefore the demands of players in S are met for sure viz, Assumption 2 holds.
It should be clear that Assumption 2 is weaker than assuming that only maximal coalitions form. All it says is that if it is possible to satisfy the demands of a coalition, without ''hurting'' any other player, then their demands will be met for sure.
Recall that in our model, players do not propose an allocation directed towards a particular coalition. Players first commit to a demand and then coalitions form 7 . Moreover, the strategies are simultaneous. Therefore, some condition such as Assumption 2 is inevitable. We do not posit that coalition formation necessarily follows any of the patterns sketched above, but merely note that there is an element of plausibility underlying both the above assumptions. We will maintain them both in the sequel.
When a candidate is chosen to play the game, he starts fresh. That is he is unaware of the utilities or the p functions of the other players. In order to choose his demand, he finds out what has happened in the past and forms beliefs about his opponents' behavior. However gathering and storing information is costly. Therefore, a player only finds out what happened in a part of the most recent history and plays a best response to the beliefs generated by this sample. This general procedure of (social) learning is from Young (1993a) where it was dubbed adaptive play.
More precisely, fix positive integers m and k such that k · m. Suppose demands have been made for at least m periods. From date m + 1 onwards, a player inspects, at random, k demand 8 vectors from the most recent m periods. It is important for this model, just as in Young (1993a) , that every sample of this size is chosen with a strictly positive probability. Sampling is done without replacement and is independent among the players.
Let ¾ denote a typical sample of k demand vectors. Consider a player, say i, who has sampled ¾ at time t. Based on the observations present in ¾, the player forecasts the distribution of his opponents' demands for the following period. This distribution and the p i function is used to determine F i (xj¾), which is the probability of the event that his demand x 2 § ± i is met, conditional on sampling ¾. We shall describe the restrictions on F i below. We assume that players are myopic. Therefore, player i's expected payoff from choosing x, conditional on sampling ¾, is
In Young (1993a), a player's forecast of his opponents' strategies is the empirical distribution of his observations from the chosen sample. In this paper, we impose a far weaker restriction. We merely assume that when a player's sample consists of a single strategy of his opponents repeated k times, he expects the same strategy to be played in the following period. We do not require any assumptions on the forecasts of the player when his sample contains observations that involve varying strategies of his opponents. In particular, our restriction imposes no constraints on what the player assumes of the correlation between his opponents' strategies.
Assumption 3 ensures that a player's forecasts are consistent with the underlying institutional details. Remarkably, our results are independent of the specification of F i for all the cases not covered by Assumption 3.
We avoid the technical difficulties that result from infinite dimensional strategy spaces as follows. We assume that for all S, f(S) is a rational number, say p S =q S . Let M = Q SµN q S where, without loss of generality, M > 0. For a non-negative integer l, define ± = 1=(10 l M).
In the appendix we show that ± is well defined. One may interpret ± as the smallest money unit.
We assume that § A demandx 2 § ± i is said to be a best response to ¾ if
The discrete strategy spaces ensure that a best response exists for every ¾.
We assume that at any given date, a player chooses a best response to the sample that he picks. If there are several best responses to the chosen sample, then each of them is played with a positive probability. Therefore, if X is realized at time t + 1 > m, then x i must be a best response to some sample ¾ contained in the most recent m periods of history h(t).
The response rules of the players described above determine a stationary Markov 9 chain. The state space of this Markov chain is -´( § ± ) m . Consider any two aribtrary states s 1 = (X 1 (1); X 1 (2); : : : ; X 1 (m)) and s 2 = (X 2 (1); X 2 (2); : : : ; X 2 (m)). The coordinates are chronologically ordered, i.e., when the process is in state s i , X i (m) is the most recent and X i (1) is the oldest record. The state s 2 is said to be a successor of s 1 if X 2 (t) = X 1 (t + 1) for all t = 1; : : : ; m -1. The transition probability from s 1 to s 2 is
if s 2 is a sucessor of s 1 and X 2 (m) = (x 1 ; x 2 ; : : : x n ).
where ¹ i (x i js 1 ) is the probability that player i demands x i in the state s 1 . Each ¹ i is a best response distribution, i.e., ¹ i (x i js 1 ) > 0 if and only if x i is a best response to some ¾ from state s 1 . Let P denote the matrix of transition probabilities. The remainder of this paper is essentially a study of the long run behavior of the Markov Chain < -; P >.
Conventions And The Core
A state s is said to be an absorbing state of < -; P > if P ss = 1. If the process enters an absorbing state at any date it continues to be in the same state thereafter. Since there is a positive probability only of reaching an immediate successor from a given state, an absorbing state must involve m repetitions of a demand vector. Consequently, dividing the surplus from f according to the self-perpetuating demand vector is the norm in an absorbing state. Therefore, absorbing states are natural candidates for equilibria in this model. We adopt the terminology introduced in Young (1993a) and refer to absorbing states as conventions. In this section we shall characterize the set of conventions directly in terms of f.
We first introduce the notation x and Â to respectively denote the state and sample in which only X is repeated. By Assumption 3 and Eq. 2, the payoff of player i if he chooses x 2 § ± i , conditional on sampling Â is U i (xjÂ)´V i (xjX -i ) where
Ifx i is a best response of player i to the sample Â then
In a state x, a player can only sample Â. Therefore, if x is to be a convention, then clearly x i must be the unique best response of player i to Â. Conversely, if x i is the unique best response of player i to the sample Â, for all i 2 N, then x must be a convention. We summarize these preliminary observations below in Proposition 1. 1. X is efficient, i.e., f(N) = X(N).
Proposition 1 A state s is a convention if and only if s=x for some
X 2 § ± such that V i (x i jX -i ) > V i (xjX -i ) 8x 2 § ± i n fx i g; 8i 2 N;(6)
There are no blocking coalitions, i.e., for all S, X(S)¸f(S).
Let C ± denote the set of core allocations.
Generally, X is said to be a core allocation only if (v 1 (x 1 ); v 2 (x 2 ); : : : ; v n (x n )) is in the core. Our definition of C ± follows from the fact that v i (:) is a strictly increasing function. Even though the demands are constrained to be strictly individually rational, it is a straightforward conclusion from Shapley (1971) that C ± is not empty since f satisfies C1 and C2.
When the division of surplus is in C ± , all the gains from cooperation are exploited and each player has a strict incentive to cooperate. Given the strong stability properties implicit in the notion of the core, it is only natural to expect m consecutive repetitions of a core allocation to self-perpetuate. What about the converse? Can we rule out x from being a convention if X is not a core allocation?
In general, one should not expect an affirmative answer. Given the features of our bargaining game, the usual arguments that involve a proposal from a blocking coalition to reject allocations that are not in the core as being unstable are not valid. In our model, when a player chooses his action, he has to take care of the various coalitions in which his demand can be met. Very little has been assumed of the p i function and it may vary in a complex way as the demands and the set of coalitions for which these demands are feasible change.
In fact, the variations in p i could be such that either one of the two conditions required of a core allocation may fail. It is possible for x to be a convention when X in not efficient. This might happen if X is feasible for smaller coalitions so that players' demands are met with some positive probability. To demand x i might then be uniquely optimal if getting x i with some probability is more attractive than getting a smaller demand for sure and if a higher demand cannot be met due to Assumption 1. For similar reasons, x could be a convention even if X is strictly feasible for some coalitions. The examples following Theorem 1 below further highlight these concerns.
In the light of the intuitive arguments presented above, the isomorphism between C ± and the set of conventions we shall establish in Theorem 1 below is surprising. The key to Theorem 1 and other results in Section 4 are the properties identified below in Lemma 1. In this lemma, we show that if the demands are strictly feasible for some coalition, then there is at least one player who can unilaterally increase his demand and still get it with probability one.
Definition 3 Given X, a coalition S is said to exhibit property Q(X) if
1. X is strictly feasible for S.
For every T that does not contain S, X(T) · f(T) implies X(S [ T) < f(S [ T ).
The primary difference between properties Q(X) and P(X) is that the former insists on strict feasibility whenever the candidate coalition S is involved whereas the latter only requires feasibility.
Before reading further, we urge the reader to bear in mind the following two aspects of the model. First, our discretization of the strategy spaces has been such that f(S) and X(S) are integral multiples of ±, for all S and for all X. Therefore, whenever X(S) < f(S), it is possible for an i 2 S to unilaterally increase his demand by [f(S) -X(S)] so that the new demands are feasible but not strictly feasible for S. Second, if p(x i jX -i ) = 0, then x i cannot be the unique best response to X. Without being explicit, we shall use both these facts repeatedly throughout the sequel.
Lemma 1
Suppose X is such that X(S) < f(S) for some S. There exists a coalition S ¤ µ S such that
S
¤ exhibits property Q(X).
For every
Proof. We shall first prove part 1. By hypothesis X(S) < f(S) for some S. If S exhibits Q(X), the proof is complete on setting S´S ¤ . If S does not exhibit Q(X), we can find a T that does not contain S such that
is a strict, non-empty 10 subset of S. Furthermore,
If S 1 satisfies Q(X), the proof is complete upon setting S 1´S ¤ . If not, we can repeat the above procedure but only finitely many times and end with a sequence S 1 ¾ S 2 ¾ : : : ¾ S k where S k contains at least two players. If S k were a singleton say fig, then x i < f(fig), which is a contradiction. Set S k = S ¤ to complete the proof of part 1. Now, observe that when a coalition S exhibits property Q(X), an i 2 S can increase his demand x i by a strictly positive amount and still ensure that S exhibits property P(X). Apply this to S ¤ and use Assumption 2 to conclude part 2 of the Lemma.
Theorem 1 x is a convention if and only if
Proof. Suppose X 2 C ± . First note that N exhibits property P(X). By Assumption 2,
Therefore x i is the unique best response to Â. By Proposition 1 x is a convention.
Conversely, let x be a convention. First, we claim that for each i 2 N, there exists a S i such that X(S i ) · f(S i ) and i 2 S i . Suppose, by way of contradiction, that the claim is not true. If i is the player for whom no such coalition exists, then by Assumption 1, p i (x i jX -i ) = 0. This implies that x i is not the unique best response to Â. By Proposition 1 this contradicts our original hypothesis that x is a convention.
Second, we claim X(S)¸f(S) for all S. Suppose that, by way of contradiction, there exists a S such that X(S) < f(S). By Lemma 1, there exists i 2 N, such that p i (xjX -i ) = 1 for x > x i . This implies V i (xjX -i ) > V i (x i jX -i ). Again, by Proposition 1 this contradicts that x is convention.
It now suffices to show that X(N) · f(N) to complete the proof. By the second claim,
for all S and T. To see this, consider the following inequalities:
Now use this observation, the two claims above and the fact that
We conclude this section with two counter examples to Theorem 1 when C1 is violated. We maintain all other assumptions. In both the examples, let v i (x) = x for all i 2 N and ± = 1. The first example shows that an allocation that meets only the second of the two criteria required of elements of C ± can perpetuate in a convention.
Example 1 Let N = f1; 2; 3g; f(f1; 2) = f(f1; 3g) = 4; f(N) = 5 and f(S) = 0 for all other S µ N. § ± i = f1; 2; 3; 4; 5g and C ± = f(3; 1; 1)g. Assume that whenever f1; 2g and f1; 3g are the only coalitions for which X is feasible, each of them is equally likely to form. Apply Proposition 1 to the V i functions given below to verify that x ¤ is a convention where X ¤ = (1; 3; 3).
where i = 2; 3.
The following example shows that an allocation that meets only the first of the two criteria required of elements of C ± can perpetuate as a convention.
Example 2 Let N = f1; 2; 3; 4g; f(fig) = 0; f(fi; jg) = f(fi; j; kg) = 7 and f(N) = 16 where i 6 = j 6 = k 2 N. § ± i = f1; 2; : : : ; 16g. Clearly f is not convex but (4; 4; 4; 4) 2 C ± . Given X, assume that all coalitions for which X is feasible are equally likely to form, subject of course to Assumption 2.
X ¤ = (3; 3; 3; 7) is an efficient allocation which is strictly feasible for f1; 2g, f2; 3g and f1; 3g. However, x ¤ is a convention. To see this, first note that N exhibits P(X ¤ ). Therefore
x if x 2 f1; 2; 3g 2 3 x if x = 4 0 if x 2 f5; 6; : : : ; 16g.
It is now easy to conclude that x is a convention by using Proposition 1.
Global Stability Of The Core
The purpose of this section is to derive a sufficient condition under which players can learn to reach a convention from an arbitrary initial state. Our main result is as follows:
for all i. Given an arbitrary initial state, the probability that the state at time t, s(t), is not a convention converges to zero as t ! 1.
By virtue of Theorems 1 and 2 it follows that players almost surely learn to adopt a core allocation, regardless of the initial state.
We shall use Theorem 1 from Young (1993) to deduce Theorem 2. Towards this end, construct the best-reply graph ¡ as follows: Each vertex of ¡ is an element of § ± . There is a directed edge from a vertex X to a different vertex e X if and only if there exists a coalition S such that
The notation X S ! e X is used to denote such an edge and S is called the index of this edge. A vertex X is said to be a sink if there is no directed edge that leads away from X. It is clear that a vertex X is a sink if and only if it is a core allocation. ¡ is said to be weakly acyclic if from any initial vertex X there exists a directed path to some vertex e X which is a sink. The adjective ''weakly'' is used to indicate that ¡ may involve cycles.
A considerably stronger restriction on players' forecasts relative to ours and the assumption that the index at every edge of ¡ is a singleton is used in Young (1993a) to establish convergence, provided ¡ is weakly acyclic and k=m ·
, where L ¡ is the maximum length of all the shortest paths to a sink from an arbitrary vertex of ¡. Roughly speaking, the idea is that incomplete sampling allows for sufficient randomness in players' choices. This allows one to construct a sequence of chance events due to which players are able to coordinate on ''strategies along a path in ¡ that leads to a sink'' and thereupon establish a convention.
The reader familiar with Young (1993a) will note that our broader definition of ¡ and the milder assumption on players' forecasts notwithstanding, only a trivial modification of the proof described there is necessary to conclude that k=m ·
is sufficient for convergence, provided we establish that ¡ is weakly acyclic. Against this background, it suffices to show that ¡ is weakly acyclic: repeating the constructions in Young (1993a) for the general case is limited in interest and novelty. Lemma 2 below establishes that ¡ is weakly acyclic. It can also be seen from the proof of this lemma that the length of a path from an arbitrary vertex to a sink in ¡ depends only on the number of coalitional constraints. Hence L ¡ · 2 n -(n+1). Observe that
to obtain the sufficient condition presented in Theorem 2 above.
Before we study acyclicity of ¡ in the general case, we focus on the special instance of N = f1; 2; 3g in Proposition 2 below. Besides making this study accessible to the reader not familiar with Young (1993a) , a rigorous analysis of this special case achieves two useful objectives. First, it lays bare the essential logic of the proof for the general case as well.
Second, it allows us to demonstrate that the upper bound on players' information in Theorem 2 is only a sufficient condition that works for all convex characteristic functions. It is by no means the sharpest one. Indeed, for the three player case, we present a tighter upper bound.
Proposition 2 Let N = f1; 2; 3g and k=m · 1 3 . Given an arbitrary initial state the probability that s(t), the state at time t, is not a convention converges to zero as t ! 1.
Proof. To ease exposition, let m = 3k. Let s(t) = (¾ 1 ; ¾ 2 ; ¾ 3 ) be the state at date t, where ¾ l denotes the sample that consists of demands made from dates t -m + lk + 1 to tm + (l + 1)k, where l = 0; 1; 2. Suppose we show that there is a positive probability of reaching a convention in at most 7k periods. Since s(t) is arbitrary, we would then have shown that for each s 2 -, there is a probability p s > 0 of reaching a convention in 7k periods. Or the probability of not reaching a convention in 7k periods is at most (1 -p), where p = min s2-p s > 0. Therefore, the probability of not reaching a convention in r(7k) periods is at most (1 -p) r , which converges to zero as r ! 1.
Let x i be a best response of player i to ¾ 3 and let X denote the corresponding demand vector. There is a positive probability that all players sample ¾ 3 for the first k periods following date t. Therefore, there is a positive probability X is realized in each of these k periods. Or, there is a positive probability that s(t + k) = (¾ 2 ; ¾ 3 ; Â).
Now suppose s(t
If X 2 C ± , then arg max x2 § ± i V i (xjX -i ) = x i , by Theorem 1. Since there is a positive probability that all three players sample from the most recent k periods from date t + k + 1 onwards, there is a positive probability that s(t + 3k) = x. Suppose X = 2 C ± . Depending on the characteristics of X. We shall exhibit a path from X to a core allocation that takes one of the following three forms.
For the sake of argument, let us say we are in case 2. Now there is positive probability that players in S sample Â while players in S c sample ¾ 3 from dates t + k + 1 to t + 2k. Therefore there is a positive probability that s(t + 2k) = (¾ 3 ; Â; Â 1 ). Conditional on s(t + 2k) = (¾ 3 ; Â; Â 1 ), there is a positive probability that between dates t + 2k + 1 and 3k, all three players sample Â 1 . Therefore there is a positive probability that s(t + 3k) = (Â; Â 1 ; Â 2 ). Finally conditional on s(t + 3k) = (Â; Â 1 ; Â 2 ), there is a positive probability that all three players sample Â 2 for the next 2k periods so that s(t + 5k) = x 2 .
The preceding arguments show that in case 2, there is a positive probability of reaching a convention in at most 5k periods from an arbitrary initial state. We leave it to the reader to supply almost identical arguments as those above to establish that there is a positive probability of converging to the convention x 1 in case 1 and x 4 in case 3 in 3k and 7k periods respectively.
The proof is now complete if from each vertex we can exhibit a path to the core that is of one of the three forms asserted above. There are essentially three different cases.
Case A: x i + x j¸f (N) for all pairs i 6 = j.
Note that X 1 = (±; f(f1; 2g) -±; f(N) -f(f1; 2g) 2 C ± and X N ! X 1 is the required path since arg max x2 § ± i V i (xjX -i ) = § ± i . Case B: f(fi; jg) < x i + x j < f(N) for at least one pair i 6 = j.
Assume without loss of generality that f(f1; 2g) < x 1 + x 2 < f(N). Let x 1 3 = maxff(N) -x 1 -x 2 ; f(f1; 3g) -x 1 ; f(f2; 3g) -x 2 g. We leave it to the reader to verify the following:
! X 2 is a path in ¡ and X 2 2 C ± , where
Case C: x i + x j · f(fi; jg), for at least one pair i 6 = j.
Assume, without loss of generality, that x 1 + x 2 · f(f1; 2g). Again, we leave it to the reader to verify that
is a path in ¡ and that X 4 2 C ± , where
Lemma 2 ¡ is weakly acyclic.
Proof. Given X, let¯(X) and°(X) denote the set of coalitions for which X is feasible and strictly feasible respectively. Partition the vertices of ¡ as follows:
First we will show that there is a path from a vertex in A to a vertex in either B or C. For vertices in B and C, we will exhibit a path that possibly goes back and forth between these two sets and ends at a core allocation i.e. a sink (in C). Case B: Let X 1 2 B. Suppose we have found a path from X 1 to X j such that°(X j ) 6 = Á, where j¸1. Now follow the edge X j i j ! X j+1 , where i j 2 S j for some S j 2°(X j ) that exhibits property Q(X j ). Lemma 1 implies that such a S j exists and that°(X j+1 ) ½°(X j ). In finitely many steps we reach a X J+1 such that°(X J ) 6 = Á but°(X J+1 ) = Á. Moreover, (X J+1 ) 6 = Á, since X J+1 must be feasible for at least one coalition that contains player i J . In other words, X J+1 2 C.
Case C: Let X 2 C. Since°(X) 6 = Á, if S; T 2¯(X), then S [ T 2¯(X). We have already verified this in Theorem 1. Hence, there is a unique largest coalition, say T 0 , for which X is feasible. If T 0 = N, then X is a core allocation and there is nothing to prove. Otherwise consider the edge X . Therefore, the index i j can be chosen as described. Let T 1 denote the largest (unique) coalition for which the X J+1 is feasible. By construction, T 0 is a strict subset of T 1 . If T 1 = N we are done. Otherwise, set X J+1´X1 and repeat these arguments. In finitely many iterations, we are lead to a core allocation when T 1 = N.
Discussion
This paper has studied an allocation problem in a dynamic setting. In this study, we have chosen to impose relatively mild restrictions on the institutional details regarding coalition formation. The trade-off is an extensive use of the convexity assumption C1. The main feature of the model that allows us to obtain global stability (in a probabilistic sense) of core allocations is the weak acyclicity of ¡. Convexity plays a crucial role in proving this. If C ± is empty, it is not hard to construct examples in which ¡ is not weakly acyclic, even under Assumptions 1 and 2. In fact in such cases even conventions may not exist. The following is one such example.
Example 3 Let N = f1; 2; 3g; f(fi; jg) = 3; f(N) = 4, and f(S) = 0 otherwise, where i 6 = j 2 N. Let v i (x) = x and take ± = 1. Then § ± i = f1; 2; 3; 4g and it is easy to check that C ± = Á. When X is feasible only for two of the three two player coalitions, we assume that each of them is equally likely to form. For x to be a convention it must be the case that x i 2 f1; 2g for all i 2 N. Otherwise, p i (xjX -i ) = 0 or all x 2 § ± i . Therefore it suffices to check if the demand vectors X 1 = (1; 1; 1), X 2 = (1; 2; 1) and X 3 = (1; 2; 2) can perpetuate as conventions. All other cases are symmetric. Note that X C ± may be non-empty even if f is not convex 11 . However, in such cases we lose the equivalence between core allocations and conventions. (See Examples 1 and 2.) Lack of a ''crisp'' characterization of the set of conventions in these cases prevents a constructive proof of acyclicity of ¡. When C ± is non-empty we have neither a proof of weak acyclicity of ¡ , constructive or otherwise, nor an example to the contrary. Therefore, the problem of extending the results reported here for more general characteristic functions, remains open. 12 Therefore, f(fig) is never a unique best response to any sample. Hence, an allocation in C ± that is not in C ¤ ± cannot perpetuate as a convention. Consequently, the proof of Theorem 1 is a proof of an isomorphism between C ¤ ± and the set of conventions. All our results can now be restated for C ¤ ± instead of C ± . Most real world transactions do involve a smallest money unit. So the assumption of finite strategy spaces is plausible. At any rate, relaxing the assumption of discrete strategy spaces is not altogether straightforward. To begin with, one needs appropriate assumptions on p i 's so that a best response exists for all samples. Once this is done, the ''static'' results, namely all the results in Section 2 and Lemma 2, generalize fairly directly. Finiteness of strategy spaces was explicitly used in the proof of Proposition 2 (or Theorem 2) to conclude that the minimum probability of reaching a convention in finite time from an arbitrary state, is bounded away from zero. Brushing aside the inevitable measurability restrictions that will be needed, it appears that some assumption that renders this probability positive is essential for proving Theorem 2 with infinite strategy spaces. These issues too are left unexplored.
Appendix
We will show that f(N) -f(S c ) -P i2S f(fig) > 0 for all S so that ± is well defined. It is well known 13 that C1 is equivalent to 8i2 N and 8 S; T µ N n fig :
Consider an arbitrary coalition S. Relabel the players so that S = f1; 2; : : : ; sg where 1 · s · n. Use the expression 8 and C2 to conclude the following sequence of inequalities: f(N) -f(N n f1g) > f(f1g) f(N n f1g) -f(N n f1; 2g)¸f(f2g)
. . . 12 This simply follows from the fact that for every player i, there is at least one X 2 C ¤ ± in which x i = f(fig)+±. 13 For example see page 122, Moulin (1988) .
